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PRESENT DAY SERBIAN ORTHODOXY

by Sergej Flere
Dr. Sergcj Flcrc is a professor at lhe School of Law, Univ ersity of Novi Sad,
Yugoslavia. he is a sociologist interested in religious developments.

1. Introduction
In order to understand present-day Serbian Orthodoxy, neither an analysis of its theology·
nor the use of a sociological approach will be sufficient. We can best grasp the inner nature of
Serbian Orthodoxy, the traditional religion of the Balkan Serbs and Montenegrins, if we focus on a
historical and political analysis of inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans where the Serbs are the
major nationality, as religious differences are often of greater importance than language or political
independence in the constituting of ethnic groups and boundaries. This applies in particular to the
relationship between Serbs and Croats, a relationship of central importance in this context.
If we say that ah analysis of the theology is not to be the main focus of our study, we are
not implying that Serbian orthodox thought has no relevant theological thesis. But, this iheology
does not have as important a place in the lives of the people who traditionally cling to this
religion as it does in most other religions. The bond between the official creed of Serbian
Orthodoxy and the beliefs and practices of even religiously devout Serbs is a thin one.
During the period of Ottoman domination in the Balkans, the Serbian Orthodox Church
·(SOC) played a major role in the survival of Serbian ethnicity. It also sanctified many Nemanjic
and Brankovic rulers and beatified the Serbian feudal state as such. Though never canonized, Milos
Obilic, who killed the Turkish sultan Murad in the fateful battle of Kosovo on St. Vitus day in
·1389, was treated as a mythical hero.who would return arid avenge. This syncretism of Eastern
Orthodoxy with popular legends took on a special meaning and significance in the 19th century
during the creation of modem Serbian nationhood and statehood, especially with the recovery of
Old Serbia (Kosovo).
The 19th century was the creation of a modern national ideology, but with romanticist
traits evoking the mythical continuity of the past, present and future. The central point of this
·

ideology was the renewal of the Serbian Empire and avenging its defeat in the battle of Kosovo. It
should be noted that the SOC did not take an active part in creating this national idealogy but did
accept it as it became a dominant mentality and today styles itself as both its creator and preSent
day standard-bearer.
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In the 19th century Serbian state, the SOC had all the traits of a state church. It was
autocephalous, but so where the Serbian Orthodox Churches in Montenegro and Austria-Hungary,
whereas in Bosnia and Herzegovina Orthodox Serbs came under the authority of the Patriarch of
Constantinople.
After World War I, when the first Yugoslav state was founded as the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes, an united SOC was organized with the seat of the Patriarchate in Belgrade.
Though all "recognized and accepted" religions were in principle equal, the SOC was, in fact, in a
privileged position and was more closely tied to the state, in a situation where the principle of
separation of church and state was not accepted. The royal family was Serbian Orthodox and under
the legal statute of 1 929, the patriarch was appointed by the King.
The SOC, though theoretically not demanding the subjugation of the state to the church,
wielded a large influence in the political life of the state which was denomoinationally plural and
where there were many unresolved questions regarding the relationship between nationalities and
·between confessions. The state was often called one of "greater Serbian hegemony". The influence
of the SOC was particularly evident during the so-called concordat crisis when it succeeded in
stopping the regulation of relations between the Yugoslav state and the Roman Catholic Church
on the basis of parity of confessions.
The most prominent spokesmen of Serbian Orthodoxy in this century have been Nikolaj
Velimirovic, Justin Popovic and today, Amfilohije Radovic and Danilo Krstic. Their work deals
with doctrinal trends which have had little in common with the 20th century consciousness and
pmctice of ordinary Serbs.
This contemporary theological school of thought radically repudiates the central concepts
created in the civilization that evolved out of the Renajssance and Enlightenment. It rejects
empiricism, analyticism, rationalism, religious pluralism and religious tolerance. Perhaps the
most emphatic is its rejection of humanism ("hominism"), which puts the Human B eing instead.
of God in the forefront of values.
The Enlightenment's values are said to have produced a de-Christianing decadence which
has downgraded Europe to the level of a "White Demony". Jesus therefore, is understood to have
taken his blessings away from (western) Europe. (Western) Europe has responded:

'Instead of love we hold a manly hatred against all who disagree with us, that
is our program. your love is just a fable. Instead of it we stress: nationalism and
internationalism, scientism and cultrualism. There is our deliverance, You (Jesus)
leave us alone.' Then Jesus .left Europe and in it arrived rage, horror, destruction
and annihilation. The pre-Christian barbarism returned. ( Popovic, 1974: 210-11).
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Reading Popovic's work we find ethnocentric statements: the true victors of the 19th
c�ntury were "Serbian peasants and Russian muzhiks, because great is the one who is humble. The
Serbian peasants showed braveness in carrying the cross, martyrdom, and a fisherman's apostolic
wisdom." (Popovic, 1974: 207).
The antimodemist ideology did not have a major impact on the traditional flock of the
SOC, though a change in this respect may now be under way. In this vein, D. Bogdanovic, an
influential Orthodox thinker, though not formally a theologian; stated publicly in 1985: "He who
is an atheist today will be an anarchist tomorrow and certainly a nihilist the day after. The
relationship between theism and materialism is a battle between the sons of light and the sons of
darkness, the war between Christ's disciples with Antichrist." (Povratak bogova, 1986: 9). This
manichean and �ilitant way of speaking in a society with a secular official culture and in a part of
the country that is traditionally Roman Catholic indicates a new aggressive attitude on the part of a
segment within the SOC in the 80s.
There is a particularly strong current of pre-Christian beliefs in the empirical
consciousness of the traditionally oriented Serbs. It is often to be found in those who adhere to
other religions as well-almost as a rule-but its presence can be said to be more prominent here.
An example is the ancestor cult Christianized into the celebration of the family saint (krsna slava).
Krsna slava or the family saint day cannot be found in any other branch of Eastern Orthodoxy. Its

function is primarily to strengthen family and ethnic ties. Taking on a Christian form in general is
the transformed worship of pagan gods "which can do harm" (Kulisic, 1970; Viahovic, 1968,
1968; Cajkanovic, 1973). The belief in magic is also present in many Serbian Orthodox believers,
as are the pre-Christianic taboos (Bandic, 1980). All these elements appear in empirical beliefs and
practices as a single syncretism.
2. World War II and Socialist Modernization

·

During World War II The Yugoslav lands were formally dismembered by the Axis
occupying forces and the Serbs and their Church were often severely persecuted, particularly in
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. And yet, the Holy Synod operated in Belgrade. It is, therefore,
difficult to give a full and accurate assessment of the position and activity of the SOC during
World War II outside a wider historical study, though it can be said to have been basically divided.
The Patriarch was imprisoned and deported by the occupying forces. On the other hand, soon after
the occupation of 1941 the Holy �ynod stated that the Church "would loyally carry out the laws
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and ordinances of the German occupying authorities and that it will, through it organs, influence
the upholding of peace, order and subjugation." (Unkonvic,

1986: 76-77)

'

More important wa<> the new orientation of the SOC's traditional flock after the speedy
collapse of the first Yugoslav state. The traditional flock found its<:lf in different situations, though
they were all unfavorable from the standpoint of national and social liberty: the greater part of
Serbia proper was occupied by German Nazi forces, a smaller part by Bulgarian forces, but many
Serbs living in other Yugoslav lands found themselves in different positions. Quite a number
. found themselves in the puppet "Independent State of Croatia", whereas Dalmatia and Montenegro
(where Serbs also traditionally live) were occupied by Italian Fascist forces, and Voivodina (where
the majority of the population is Serbian) was occupied by Ungarian forces.
The speedy collapse of the first Yugoslav state largely brought persecution to the Serbs.
This was not only a political collapse of the state, but also an economic collapse and the collapse
of the idea of Yugoslavhood as based on an, in fact, nonexistent ethnic unity and, therefore,
without autonomy for the different ethnic groups and cultural regions.
The traditional Serbian-anti-foreign-domination tendency found itself tied to a secular
movement led by communists, a movement with democratic and populist traits. The National
Liberation movement led by Marshal Tito-the only one of pan-Yugoslav character and offering
the prospect of inter-ethnic reconciliation-was overwhelmingly accepted by Serbs, who also
comprised a relative majority of its members. Though the movement actively tolerated religious
expression, religion had no part in its ideology, thereby opening a completely different perspective
to the Serbian people.
This paved the way for a development wherein the religiosity of the Serbs, as a set of
doctrinal beliefs and practices, began to disappear unusually swiftly during and after World War II.
Moreover, a growing sense of the irrelevance of religion, and of overt irreligion (often in the form
of emotional atheism) occurred much more swiftly among the Serbs and Montenegrins than among
traditional Catholics and Muslims in Yugoslav lands.
The Serbs accepted a secular ideology within a communist-led indigenous movement, but
this development was also conditioned by the fact that the SOC did not have a particular doctrinal
strength nor a strong organizational structure. Its earlier strength sprang from its closeness to the
people as an instrument of national emancipation and protection, a function now passed into the
hands of secular forces. Furthermore, the Serbs' conscience was not troubled by a national
oppression syndrome, the way it was among the Irish, the Poles and to some extent the Croats,
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which lends a special strength and relevance to religion as a set of symbols and to the ecclesiastic
organization as its bearer.
Religiousness, especially in traditional Serbian Orthodox regions of Yugoslavia-with a
purely gnoseological definition of religion in mind-was often regarded as a form of cultural
backwardness, so that irreligiosity became part of a socially "emancipated" world-view, and as
somethiiig which was part of conformist behavior.
With the institutional separation of church and state in Yugoslavia, and with restriction of
church activities to spiritual matters, the position of religious organizations was probably the least
conducive for activities in traditional Orthodox parts of Yugoslavia. Along with the inner nature of
Orthodoxy to accept and submit to a nationally independent regime, the effect was that the
traditional SOC flock was the least religious in Yugoslav terms.
The demise of religiosity among the Serbian Orthodox was reported as relatively greater
. in empirical research. In a 1964 survey of the multiconfessional region of Herzegovina Cimic
found that among traditional Catholics 66% were religious, among traditional Muslims 56%,
whereas only 28% of the traditional Serbian Orthodox were found to be religious. (1966: 111-31).
Our research, conducted also in a multiethnic and multiconfessional region, in Voivodiana in 1975,
found that ethnic Hungarians and Croatians were more frequently believers (37-44%) than were
Serbs (28%). (Flere and Pantie, 1977: 157-62).
Orthodox rituals, traditionally practiced by the Serbian and Montenegrin flock, never did
become a minority phenomenon, in spite of the changes of beliefs and world view, suggesting that
Serbian Orthodoxy is mainly a ritualistic religion. The family saint celebration, marriage, baptism
and burial with religious ceremony were still practiced by at least half of the traditional Serbian
Orthodox flock. One may speculate that these rituals lost their inner spiritual meaning. Both
traditional ritual and doctrinal religiosity remained concentrated in rural areas, especially among
women and the elderly.
The secularization-atheization process continued (though it was not systematically·
followed) until the beginning of the 80s, when doctrinal religiosity was already a rare phenomenon
among the Serbs. The stemming of this process could have been noted from research on a
Yugoslav youth sample carried out in 1985. S. Vrcan found that 59% of the young were religious
(this included those who "were not sure"). Among Croatians 55% were religious, among Muslims
(in the ethnic sense) 32%, among Slovenians 41%, among Macedonians 31%, among ethnic
Albanians 48%, whereas the number was again the lowest with those who traditionally belong to
Serbian Orthodoxy: Serbs 18% and Montenegrins 13%. (Vrcan et al., 1986: 157-63).
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3. Contemporary Developments: A Revival
A change in the position of the SOC within its surroundings, and in its activities,can be
noticed in the 80s. Construction has begun and fund raising campaigns are under way for the
erection of the monumental St. Sava's church and the Orthodox School of Divinity in Belgrade.
Nothing of this magnitude has been undertaken since World War II. Beside the upswing in the
'

SOC's activities, certain fermentations within it are also visible, corresponding to changes in its
surroundings. These changes have been partly prompted by the renewal and offensives on part the
two neighboring religions: the Roman Catholic Church and the Islamic Community. In an
ethnically and denominationally mixed society,like Yugoslavia,such changes in the stands of one
religion are bound to have repercussions on another.
Probably more relevant in the upswing of activity and influence of the SOC are its
origins in Yugoslavia's societal and interethnic conditions. Most Yugoslav sociologists agree that
Yugoslav society is undergoing a protracted, generalized and systemic crisis. (Vrcan et al.,1983).
Such crises are known to be bases for new solutions in social organization and for cultural change.
The present crisis, however, is turning people toward historically established patterns, some of
which had been considered long gone and done with. The current economic crisis of Yugoslavia
involves soaring inflation,high unemployment,stagnating production,a decline in the standard of
living, all of which started with the 80s, following a steady 35-year period of multi-faceted growth
and modernization. But the cultural crisis has more than just economic aspects to it, and some of
them have a speical bearing on the Serbs. The malfunctioning of the federal government system
with its protracted decision-making process has led to a feeling of dissatisfaction, particularly
among Serbs who are the most numerous nationality in Yugoslavia (though they do not constitute
an absolute majority). Some of them obviously feel that their position is deteriorating. The most
important reason for the development of such a sentiment, and even a feeling of subjugation and
persecution, is probably the situation in the Kosovo region. Kosovo holds a special place in the
collective Serbian conscousness,in cultural archetypes,as the land of the historical defeat in 1389,
which was to

be and in fact was avenged in the Balkan Wars (1912-13) and liberated. In the post

World War II period, Kosovo has enjoyed an autonomous status within the Republic of Serbia,
with direct representation at the federal level. During this period the demographic picture of
Kosovo has greatly changed. Whereas the Albanian population witnessed a demographic explosion,
the birth rate among the Serbs was much lower. the Serbs also began to move out of Kosovo,
because its underdevelopment-with the highest unemployment rate in Yugoslavia-left little
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opportunity for economic advancement. A second reason for the Serbian migration out of
Kosovo-now sometimes called the 'exodus'-has been the pressure exerted by the Albanian ethnic
majority in the Kosovo region (sometimes in the form of physical persecution and coercion), in an
effort to get the Serbs to move out. As a result, at present there are few Serbs living in Kosovo
with the prospect of this region thus becoming ethnically homogeneous. Among the ethnic
Albanians a secessionist movement is present.
These adverse processes have brought about a feeling of new relevance of Orthodoxy to
the Serbs. It is mostly a matter not of rechristinization, of a return to church religiosity in the
traditional sense, but of an awareness of the relevance of traditional beliefs and ecclesiastic
institutions. There is some return to church religiosity as such, with the Church encouraging this
process.
In the last few years the biweekly Pravoslavlje, the main SOC newspaper issued by the
Patriarchate, has published letters written at the beginning of this century, before the Balkan Wars,
by Serbian priests and consular officials in Kosovo (while the region was still under Ottoman
rule). The letters, appearing under the title "Crimes and Transgressions in Kosovo", report of
crimes, attacks and assaults committed by Albanians against the Serbs, and of the passive stand
taken by the Turkish authorities. They appeal to Serbia, but also to Imperial Russia, for
protection. Thus, the paper presents a picture of continuing assaults upon the Serbs, implying that
regular means are not enough to solve the problems. the subject is seen as the "unprecedented
tragedy of a nation". (Pravoslavlje, no 455, 1986: 7).
Numerous petitions and letters to religious and secular authorities have also been
published, one asking the Patriarch what he will be able to say of his labors for the Serbian people
when he appears in front of St. Sava. All the hopes of the Serbian people are sometimes portrayed
as being pinned on the SOC, as the only historically proven protector of the Serbian people. D.
Bogdanovic comments on the stand taken by the SOC regarding the Kosovo situation: "It is
simply taking care of its flock. What else should it be doing? Should it hypocritically ponder the
subtle questions of religious feelings and visions, while the last Serbian shepherd on Mt. Sara is
being wiped out?" (Povratak bogova, 1986: 7).
Empirical research in the 80s reports low levels of religiosity in traditional Serbian
Orthodox regions and among the traditional Serbian Orthodox people in mixed areas. Pantie and
associates found that in 1985 18% of the adults in the metropolitan Belgrade area declared that they
believed in God (Pantie, 1985: 57-60), which is more or less the same percentage as 11 years
earlier, pointing to a basic stability. This stability would mean a stoppage of the secularization
7

process, which would be a change in itself. A more detailed look showed an increase among those
who doubted and those who were unsure, as well as an increase among uncertain disbelievers. On
the other hand, the number of firm disbelievers, atheists, was down from 58% to 38%. (Pantie,
1985: 110). This led Pantie to conclude that the intensity of irreligiosity was weakening, which in
itself could mean the beginning of a religious renewal.
In a 1983 study of religiousnes� in a less urbanized area (the Nis regions) D. Djordjevic
found that 24% of the adults declared themselves as believers. (Djordjevic, 19�6: 137). In all cases,
religiousness was found to be concentrated among the rural population, the elderly and the less
educated. In some cases (Pantie, 1985: 133) it was also found to be more concentrated among those
who considered themselves poor. Findings were different regarding the frequency of ritual, which
was always significantly more common.
But if changes are to be found, they are not mainly in the field of traditional religiosity,
but in the growing relevance of Orthodoxy as a tradition and an institution. The SOC is seen by a
growing number of its traditional flock not as a remnant of the past, but as a nationally relevant
institution, the most lasting and stable institution of the Serbs through history. In the mentioned
survey of religiousness in the metropolitan Belgrade area, 21% of the respondents upheld the
statement that "the SOC played an important role, but cannot be elevated above other
institutions". (Flere, 1985: 37). The first of these statements has become almost the central tenet
of the SOC's ·creed, appearing repeatedly in its publications. It certainly is true that the SOC
played such a role in its earlier history, though the leading Serbian historian V. Cubrilovic offers
another interpretation, saying that the SOC acted as an instrument of the Serbian people in
safeguarding its ethnic survival, under conditions where only ecclesiastic institutions were
recognized as legitimate, and that it should not be regarded as an independent factor. (Cubrilovic,
1958: 26). Such a role was not present in this century, when the Serbian people, by and large,
turned to secular factors of progress. On the other hand, during World War II, ecclesiastic factors
were connected with extermination, "retributions", against people belonging to other confessions.
(Dedijer et al., 1974: ch. 45). Therefore, in the Yugoslav context, claims by a confessional
community of serving as a national protector, evoke memories of war, strife and genocide.
The SOC's gaining relevance is stimulated by romanticist and sentimentalist statements:
"Few are the nations in the world which have a Studenica (monastery) and which can celebrate
eight centuries of its existence. . . Great are those peoples who have built for eternity." The well
known Serbian writer D. Cosic goes on to say that "the history of the Serbian people is a tragic
one." "Therefore, only by understanding one's own national and social essence, can one master
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one's own fate." (Pravoslavlje, 1986, no. 455: 4). Thus, one arrives at the ethnic idealization and
idea of "ethnic exceptionalism", as with the "sweettongued" bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic.
According to him,the Serbs are a people chosen by God,a people who never erred against God or
against others (only against their own interests) and "were it not for a special Divine protection
this people would have perished from the face of the earth a long time ago." (Velimirovic, 1981:
186).
Voices calling for modernization can also be heard within the Church, but they are few
(Gavrilovic, 1986) and with no visible impact upon Church life. The questions relevant in this
context are: the democratization of Church government, with a role for the laity and a greater role
for the lower clergy, as well as the position of women within the Church. A promodernization
attitude goes together with a less militant stand toward dominant institutions and values of secular
society.
In the last few years,relations between the SOC and the state-the Republic of Serbia
have become fairly goo � . This refers to the official SOC, not its radical, nationalistic and
fundamentalist wing which has also emerged in the 80s and which calls for a more aggressive
stance on the part of the official Church.
The agreement on and actual resumption of the construction of the monumental St. Sava
Church in Belgrade is a sign of improving relations. The SOC press has given a favorable
assessment of the steps taken by the Serbian Republic authorities to protect Serbs in Kosovo, but
not of the activities undertaken by the federal authorities. These improved relations with the state
correspond with the inner nature of Orthodoxy, which historically is not prepared to play the role
of ecclesia militans in an ethnically emancipated state. Whereas we may speak of relatively good
relations between the SOC and the Republic of Serbia, this is not the case in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and in Montenegro.
Such an overall situation is not particularly conducive to the development of ecumenism
in Yugoslavia, particularly regarding relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the SOC.
There are some on-going contacts between the two Churches' theologians and students of divinity.
There are instances of cooperation in the use of sacral facilities, but basically the SOC still has
many reservations regarding the Catholic Church, particularly regarding the question of "union"
which is interpreted to mean the domination of Catholicism over Orthodoxy. There is also concern
within the SOC as to what is seen as de facto recognition of the Macedonian Orthodox Church by
the Holy See. J. Popovic still spoke of the Pope as a " satanic figure". (1974: 19). In order to
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promote the cooperation with the Catholic Church, the SOC demands that the former renounce
some of its stands as having been wrong from the beginning.
The SOC takes a very adverse stand regarding the activities of relatively numerous
Protestant, sect-type communities on Serbian soil labeling them as extraneous. These groups are
concentrated and most active in Vojvodina
These trends in the development of Serbian Orthodoxy in the 80s and the leveling off of
declining religiousness in Yugoslavia in general were not anticipated by Yugoslav scholars writing
about religion. Theoretically most of them accepted the view taken by Marx's early writings that
religion is a form of alienation and false consciousness which would wither away with the
development of self-management as a form of human emancipation, where social relations become
transparent and the human being regains control over them. Modernization was interpreted as
striving in this same direction. This development was usually seen as being basically unilinear.
New developments have called for taking a broader view in order to offer a plausible
explanation for the cessation of the secularization-atheization process. The approach taken toward
the latter encompasses ideas on the "crisis of modernization" and particularly on the "crisis of
Yugoslav society". This approach was most developed by Vrcan (1986) who recognizes epochal
civilization, socialist and Yugoslav components in the origins of the cessation of the
secularization process.
4. Conclusion
The SOC has definitely awakened from this postwar lethargy. Its growing relevance to its
traditional floc is not something we can say will be gaining momentum in the future, but it is
unlikely

to

revert back to a marginal position and its activities will probably not drop to previous

levels. The trend will depend primarily on the ability to overcome the Yugoslav cultural crisis and
particularly on the state of inter-ethnic relations within Yugoslavia.
The SOC is unlikely to become part of the legitimative order, as is the case in Bulgaria,
within an ethnocentric ideology. If Serbian Orthodoxy is to gain momentum, it will be as an
independent traditionalist and ethnically centered force and more as a cultural than as a political or
supra-political force.
Important developments to follow will be internal relation within the SOC, where
demands for aggiornamento are present and may be articulated as to forms or organization, role of
the laity, the lower clergy and women.
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